Abstract. We define a class of finite state automata acting on transfinite sequences, and use these automata to prove that no singular cardinal can be defined by a monadic second order formula over the ordinals.
In this paper we tackle the definability of ω ω . We show in ZFC that it is not definable. In fact, no singular cardinal is definable over (ON; <) through a monadic formula.
Our proof uses certain finite state automata, introduced and defined precisely in Section 2, to uniformly reduce monadic statements about α to statements in a language that allows second order quantifiers and quantifiers of the kind "for almost all ξ < α," but does not allow standard first order quantifiers. This language is defined precisely in Section 1. The truth value of sentences in this "almost-all" language is invariant under restrictions to a club subset of the underlying domain. It follows that if a sentence of the language holds in a structure with domain τ , it holds also in a structure with domain cof(τ ).
Hence an almost-all sentence cannot become true for the first time at a singular cardinal.
The main result connecting monadic statements and our finite state automata is Theorem 5.1, where we show that for every monadic formula ϕ there is an automaton A, I, F so that (θ; <) |= ϕ[a 1 , . . . , a k ] iff A, I, F accepts the characteristic function of a 1 , . . . , a k . Results of these kind were used by Büchi and others in proofs of decidability of the monadic theory of (θ; <), first for θ = ω, then for all countable θ in Büchi [1] , for θ = ω 1 in Büchi [2] , and finally for all ordinals θ < ω 2 in Büchi-Zaiontz [3] . What is new here is the scope and uniformity of the theorem-there is no limitation on θ, and the automaton A, I, F depends on ϕ but not on θ-and the fact that our automata may consult the truth value of sentences in the almost-all language during their runs. It is through this latter feature that Theorem 5.1 reduces monadic truth to truth in the almost-all language. It should be noted that there have been earlier generalizations of the theory of automata to ordinals at ω 2 and above, specifically in Wojciechowski [9, 10] . But these generalizations, lacking the reference to the almost-all language, could not capture monadic truth.
With Theorem 5.1 at hand, a simple analysis of runs of our finite state automata, carried out in Section 6 using the fact that almost-all sentences cannot become true for the first time at a singular cardinal, shows that no singular cardinal is definable over (ON; <) through a monadic formula.
A similar analysis cannot be performed on regular cardinals, since they may be definable through a formula in the almost-all language (as indeed is the case for each ω n , and for ω ω+1 in Magidor's model). Let us also note that, though the conversion from ϕ to A, I, F in Theorem 5.1 is effective, it does not by itself establish the decidability of the monadic theory of θ, since the almost-all theory of θ need not be decidable for θ ≥ ω 2 . For more on decidability, and undecidability, at the level of ω 2 , see Shelah [8] and Gurevich-Magidor-Shelah [5] . §1. The "almost-all" language. Fix, for the entire section, a non-empty finite set S. We describe a language L The proof of ( * ) is an induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case consists of atomic ϕ, for which ( * ) follows from the conditions of Definition 1.8 and condition (i) above. The inductive cases are straightforward. Let us just note that for ϕ of the form (∀ * α)ψ or (∀ * α < β)ψ, the clubs witnessing truth in (γ; s, r) can be taken to be subsets of C, and similarly with (γ * ; s * , r * ) and C * . ⊣ Definition 1.10. r, r * : γ ⇀ S are almost equal, denoted r ≈ r * , if r(α) = r * (α) for all but finitely many α ∈ γ.
Corollary 1.11. Suppose that r ≈ r * . Then for every sentence ϕ in L * S , (γ; s, r) |= ϕ iff (γ; s, r * ) |= ϕ. Proof. Fix (γ; s, r) with cof(γ) ≥ ω 1 . Let D = cf(s). Let C ⊂ γ be a club so that cf(s↾ α) = D for all α ∈ C. An induction on complexity, similar to the one used in the proof of Claim 1.9, establishes the following statement: ( * ) Let ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) be a formula with k free variables. Then whenever a 1 , . . . , a k are such that a i ∈ C for i so that x i is first order. The current claim is the special case of ( * ) with k = 0. ⊣ Definition 1.15. Given a formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x k ) in L * S , let ϕ rel (x 1 , . . . , x k , δ) be obtained from ϕ be replacing each first order quantification of the form (∀ * α) in ϕ by (∀ * α < δ), and replacing each occurrence of cf(s) in ϕ by cf(s↾ δ).
Proof. Immediate by induction on the complexity of ϕ. ⊣ Definition 1.17. Let S be a non-empty finite set. For functions s : γ → S and s : γ → S define the function s×ŝ : γ → S × S by (s×ŝ)(α) = s(α),ŝ(α) . Define r ×r for partial functions r : γ ⇀ S andr : γ ⇀ S similarly, with (r ×r)(α) =↑ if either r(α) =↑ orr(α) =↑. Lemma 1.18. Let ϕ be a sentence in the language L * S× S
. Then there is a sentence ϕ exist in the language L Consider first the case that cof(γ) = ω. Let Q = {E ⊂ S × S | E |= ϕ}. (We are using here the notation of Definition 1.7.) Then, for γ of cofinality ω, (γ; s ×ŝ, r ×r) |= ϕ iff cf(s ×ŝ) ∈ Q.
For each E ⊂ S × S let proj(E) be the projection of E to S, that is the set {b | (∃b) b,b ∈ E}. Using the fact that S is finite, it is easy to check that (∃ŝ) cf(s ×ŝ) = E is true iff proj(E) = cf(s). So (∃ŝ) cf(s ×ŝ) ∈ Q iff there is E ∈ Q with proj(E) = cf(s).
For
Let ψ 1 be the sentence E∈Q ψ 1,proj(E) . Then: (i) For γ of cofinality ω, (γ; s, r) |= ψ 1 if and only if (∃ŝ : γ → S)(∃r : γ ⇀ S) (γ; s ×ŝ, r ×r) |= ϕ.
This takes care of the case of γ of cofinality ω in the proof of Lemma 1.18. Consider next the case that cof(γ) ≥ ω 1 . For each E ⊂ S × S let ϕ E be the formula given by Definition 1.13, so that:
(ii) For γ of cofinality ≥ ω 1 , (γ; s ×ŝ, r ×r) |= ϕ iff (γ; s ×ŝ, r ×r) |= ϕ E where E = cf(s ×ŝ).
Notice that the only references to s ×ŝ and r ×r in ϕ E come through atomic formulae of the form (s ×ŝ)(α) = b,b and (r ×r)(α) = b,b . Letb 1 , . . . ,b n enumerate S. Let x 1 , . . . , x n and y 1 , . . . , y n be distinct second order variables which do not appear in ϕ. Let ψ 2,E (x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n ) be the formula obtained from ϕ E by replacing every occurrence of (s ×ŝ)(α) = b,b i in ϕ E by (s(α) = b∧α ∈ x i ), and similarly replacing every occurrence of (r×r)(α) = b,b i in ϕ E by (r(α) = b ∧ α ∈ y i . ψ 2,E is then a formula in L * S , and:
where E = cf(s ×ŝ), A i = {ξ |ŝ(ξ) =b i }, and B i = {ξ |r(ξ) =b i }.
Call a tuple E, A 1 , . . . , A n , B 1 , . . . , B n , where E ⊂ S× S and A 1 , . . . , B n ⊂ γ, suitable for s : γ → S if:
c) For almost all α < γ (meaning for all α in a club subset of γ), α belongs to exactly one of A 1 , . . . , A n , and to at most one of B 1 , . . . , B n .
Note that there is a formula ψ suit−E (x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n ) in L * S so that (γ; s, r) |= ψ suit−E [A 1 , . . . , A n , B 1 , . . . , B n ] iff E, A 1 , . . . , A n , B 1 , . . . , B n is suitable for s. Claim 1.19. Let γ have cofinality ≥ ω 1 , let s : γ → S, and let r : γ ⇀ S. Then (∃ŝ : γ → S)(∃r : γ ⇀ S) (γ; s ×ŝ, r ×r) |= ϕ iff there is E ⊂ S ×Ŝ, and there exist A 1 , . . . , A n , B 1 , . . . , B n ⊂ γ, so that:
Proof. The direction left-to-right is clear: simply take E = cf(s ×ŝ), A i = {ξ |ŝ(ξ) =b i }, and B i = {ξ |r(ξ) =b i }.
Suppose conversely that E, A 1 , . . . , A n , and B 1 , . . . , B n satisfy conditions (1) and (2). Using conditions (a)-(c) it is possible to findŝ : γ → S,r : γ ⇀ S, and a club C ⊂ γ so that cf(s ×ŝ) = E, {ξ |ŝ(ξ) =b i } ∩ C = A i ∩ C, and {ξ |r(ξ) =b i } ∩ C = B i ∩ C for each i. By condition (2), condition (iii) above, and Remark 1.12, (γ; s ×ŝ, r ×r) |= ϕ. ⊣
For each E ⊂ S × S let ψ 3,E be the sentence (∃x 1 ) · · · (∃x n )(∃y 1 ) · · · (∃y n ) (ψ suit−E (x 1 , . . . , x n , y 1 , . . . , y n )∧ψ 2,E (x 1 , . . . , x n , y n , . . . , y n )) in the language L * S . Let ψ 3 be the sentence E⊂S× S ψ 3,E . By the last claim, (iv) For γ of cofinality ≥ ω 1 , (γ; s, r) |= ψ 3 iff (∃ŝ : γ → S)(∃r : γ ⇀ S) (γ; s × s, r ×r) |= ϕ.
, where ψ 1 is taken from condition (i) above, and ϕ ctbl−cof and ϕ cof≥ω1 are taken from Claim 1.4. Then ϕ exist satisfies the requirements of Lemma 1.18. 2 (Lemma 1.18) Claim 1.20. Let S be finite non-empty. Let π 1 : S → S and π 2 : S × S → S. (We refer to π 1 and π 2 as projections.) Let ϕ be a sentence in L * S . Then there is a sentenceφ in L * S so that, for limit γ, (γ;ŝ,r) |=φ if and only if
Proof. For each b ∈ S let P 1 (b) = π 1 −1′′ {b} and let P 2 (b) = π 2 −1′′ {b}. Letφ be obtained from ϕ by replacing every occurrence of s(α) = b in ϕ by b ∈P1(b)ŝ (α) =b, making similar replacements to occurrences of b ∈ cf(s) and b ∈ cf(s↾ α), and replacing each occurrence of r(α) = b by b ,ĉ ∈P2(b) (ŝ(α) =b ∧ r(α) =ĉ). (Empty disjunctions, if they occur, are taken to be the sentence False.) ϕ is then a sentence in L * S , and it is easy to check that it satisfies the demands of the claim. Let us just note that the verification uses the equivalence b ∈ cf(π 1 •ŝ) iff (∃b)(π 1 (b) = b ∧b ∈ cf(ŝ)). The right-to-left direction of this equivalence is immediate, and the left-to-right direction uses the fact that S is finite.
⊣ §2. Automata. Let Σ be a finite non-empty set. By a Σ-automaton we mean a tuple A = S, P, T, ϕ, Ψ, h, u where:
1. S and P are finite non-empty sets.
. h is a function from S into P with the property that h(b) ∈ P − u(b) for each b ∈ S.
A is called deterministic if T is a function from S × Σ into S, meaning that for each pair b, σ ∈ S × Σ there is precisely one b * ∈ S so that b, σ, b * ∈ T . We refer to Σ as the alphabet, to S as the set of states of A, and to P as the set of pebbles. T is the successor transition table. ϕ and Ψ determine limit transitions in a way that we explain below. h and u determine the placement and maintenance of pebbles.
Definition 2.1. Let ϕ and Ψ be as in conditions (3) and (4) above. Given a domain (γ; s, r) with γ ∈ ON, s : γ → S, and r : γ ⇀ S, define t ϕ (γ;s,r) : k → 2 by setting t ϕ (γ;s,r) (i) = 1 if (γ; s, r) |= ϕ i and t ϕ (γ;s,r) (i) = 0 otherwise for each i ≤ k. Define a function Ψ ⊕ ϕ, acting on domains (γ; s, r) as above, by setting (Ψ ⊕ ϕ)(γ; s, r) = Ψ(t ϕ (γ;s,r) ).
Remark 2.2. For D ⊂ S, set, using the terminology of Definition 1.
Let α be an ordinal and let X : α → Σ. A pair s, r where s : α + 1 → S and r : α ⇀ S is called a run of A on X just in case that it satisfies the following conditions:
the least such γ, and otherwise r(ξ) is undefined.
We think of A is running over the input X : α → Σ and producing a run s, r through a transfinite sequence of stages. In each stage β the automaton determines s(β) through either condition (S) or condition (L), depending on whether β is a successor or a limit. In the case of a successor ξ +1, the automaton determines the state s(ξ +1) based on the previous state s(ξ) and the input X(ξ), in line with the transition table T . Condition (S) expresses this precisely. In the case of limit λ, the automaton determines s(λ) based on a bounded fragment of the almost-all theory of the run (λ; s↾ λ, r↾ λ) produced so far. Condition (L) expresses this precisely. The fragment of the theory being consulted is the truth values of sentences in ϕ. The function Ψ tells the automaton how to determine s(λ) based on the fragment.
Having determined s(β), the automaton places the pebble p = h(s(β)) on the ordinal β. The pebble p remains placed on β until a later stage β * is reached with p ∈ u(s(β * )). At the first such stage β * the automaton removes the pebble from β, and sets r(β) = s(β * ). This is expressed precisely in condition (R). r(β) remains undefined until the pebble placed on β is removed, and may indeed remain undefined throughout, if the pebble is not removed at all during the run. The use of pebbles therefore introduces a delay into part of the construction of a run. Our need for this delay will be explained later, in Remarks 4.1 and 4.14.
Notice that no pebble is ever in the uncomfortable position of having to be on two or more ordinals at the same time: when p = h(s(β)) is placed on β, condition (6) in the definition of automaton above guarantees that p ∈ u(s(β)), and this results in the removal of p from any ordinalβ < β on which it might have been placed before.
When reaching a limit stage λ, the automaton is commanded by condition (L) to look at the structure (λ; s↾ λ, r↾ λ), check which of the sentences ϕ i hold in this structure, and determine s(λ) on the basis of this information through a finite table given by the function Ψ.
There are, conceivably, two ways to interpret this command. One would have the automaton look at the values of r↾ λ that are known by stage λ. The other would have the automaton look at the values reached by the end of the run. Let (r↾ λ) local consist of the values known by stage λ, and let (r↾ λ) global consist of the values known at the end of the run. The two functions need not be the same. There may well be ordinals ξ < λ which still have their pebbles at stage λ, and have the pebbles removed later on. (r↾ λ) local is not defined on these ordinals, and r(↾ λ) global is. But there can only be finitely many such ordinals ξ, since each of these ordinals requires a separate pebble, and the set P of pebbles is finite. Thus (r↾ λ)
The end result of both interpretations is the same.
We generally use (r↾ λ) local when determining s(λ). This after all is the only practical approach, since (r↾ λ)
global is not yet known at stage λ.
Condition (L) is written using what is really (r↾ λ)
global only because writing it using (r↾ λ) local would make the notation of the definition of a run much more complicated. At a successor stage ξ + 1 the automaton determines s(ξ + 1) on the basis of the state s(ξ) and input X(ξ) at stage ξ, using a finite table T . This approach, formulated by condition (S) above, is standard for automata. If the automaton is deterministic, meaning that T is a function, then there is precisely one state b so that s(ξ), X(ξ), b ∈ T , and in this case the automaton is forced to set s(ξ + 1) equal to this b. But in general there may be many (or no) states b so that s(ξ), X(ξ), b ∈ T , and the automaton may choose between them. Thus, in general, there may be many different runs of A on the same input X.
An accepting condition for an automaton A is a pair I, F where I ∈ S and F ⊂ S. A, I, F is said to accept X : α → Σ just in case that there exists a run s, r of A on X so that s(0) = I and s(α) ∈ F . L(A, I, F ), the language recognized by A, I, F , is the class {X | X : α → Σ for some ordinal α, and A, I, F accepts X}. We will show that the collection of languages recognized by automata is closed under complements, intersections, and projections.
Claim 2.3 (Closure under projections). Let Σ be a finite non-empty set. Let A be a Σ × Σ-automaton, and let I, F be an accepting condition for A. Then there is a Σ-automaton A * , and an accepting condition
Proof. This is a standard claim, using non-determinism to have A * pick X as part of its run, thereby absorbing the quantifier (∃ X) in the claim into the quantifier "there exists a run" in the definition of acceptance. To be slightly more precise, it is easy to design a Σ-automaton A * , with a set of states S * = S × Σ, so that: 1. If s ×ŝ, r ×r is a run of A * on X, then s, r is a run of A on X × X where X is given by the condition X(ξ) =ŝ(ξ + 1) for ξ < α. 2. If s, r is a run of A on X × X, then there areŝ andr so that:
•ŝ(ξ + 1) = X(ξ) for each ξ < α,ŝ(0) =σ 0 , andŝ(λ) =σ 0 for each limit λ ≤ α, whereσ 0 is some fixed element of Σ.
• s ×ŝ, r ×r is a run of A * on X.
Proof. We intend to have A C produce runs that combine both the action of A L and the action of A R . The only difficulty is with the pebbles, as A L and A R may wish to release the pebble placed on an ordinal ξ at different times. A C needs a memory cell that will hold the state causing the first release, until the time of the second release.
Let
Let A be the set of partial functions from
This defines the set of states of A C , and the set of pebbles. A state of
is a state of A R , and f is a memory function with cells f (p L , p R ), for pebbles p L and p R of A L and A R respectively. Each cell may be empty, or it may contain a state either in S L or in S R .
Set h C : S C → P C to be the function defined by the condition
Thus the pebble placed by A C at a state b L , b R , f is simply the pair made of the pebble placed by A L at state b L and the pebble placed by
* ∈ A, and f * is defined by the conditions:
Condition (2) simply formalizes the fact that A C follows A L on the left coordinate and A R on the right coordinate. Condition (3) governs the transition of the memory function.
corresponding to the pebble being placed at the current state is initialized to be undefined. Currently undefined cells f (p L , p R ) so that exactly one of p L , p R is released (by b L or b R ) are updated to store the state causing the release (this is formalized in condition (3b)). In all other cases f * continues to store the state stored by f . Define u C through the condition:
In the context of our use of π 2,L below, b C ∈ S C is a current state, causing the placement of a pebble h C (b C ), and b L , b R , f is a later state causing the release of this pebble.
gives the state in S L responsible for the release of the left coordinate of b C . This is either the left coordinate of b L , b R , f , or else it is the state stored by f .
Define π 2,R :
For a sequence f α | α < γ of functions in A define lim α −→ γ f α to be the function f ∈ A given by the condition:
Finally, define ϕ C and Ψ C so that:
Conditions (5a) and (5b) can be arranged using Claim 1.20. Condition (5c) can be arranged using references to cf(s C ).
Condition (5) completes the definition of A C . It is not hard, using most importantly the interaction between the transition from f to f * in condition (3) and the definitions of π 2,L and π 2,R , to prove the following claims:
Then there are r L , r R so that: Claim 2.6. Let s L , r L and s R , r R be runs of A L and A R respectively on a sequence X : α → Σ. Then there exists χ : α + 1 → A and r C : α ⇀ S C so that,
Let f ↑ ∈ A be the function which is undefined everywhere on
Claim 2.7. Let A be a deterministic automaton. Let I, F be an accepting condition for A. Then there is an accepting condition I * , F * for A so that A, I, F accepts X iff A, I
* , F * does not.
Proof. Set I * = I and F * = S − F . For X : α → Σ, notice that A, being deterministic, has a unique run s, r on X with s(0) = I. A, I, F accept X iff this run ends with a state s(α) in F , and A, I, F * accepts X iff the run ends with a state s(α) in S − F .
⊣ To obtain closure under negations from the last claim, we have to show that every automaton is equivalent to a deterministic automaton. We do this in Section 4, after establishing some auxiliary results in Section 3. §3. Characters. Fix, for the entire section, a finite alphabet Σ, and a Σ-automaton A = S, P, T, ϕ, Ψ, h, u . All the definitions and results in this section are stated relative to these objects, though we suppress their mention in the notation.
Fix further an ordinal θ and an input string X : θ → Σ.
and there is a run s, r of A on X↾ [α, β) with:
[α, β) here is the interval of ordinals {ξ | α ≤ ξ < β}. By a run s, r of A on X↾ [α, β) we mean a pair s, r so that s : [α, β] → S, r : [α, β) ⇀ S, and the pair s, r satisfies conditions (S), (L), and (R) in Section 2 for ξ ∈ [α, β) and limit λ ∈ (α, β].
Remark 3.2. The application of condition (L) here involves references to truth value in structures (λ, s↾ λ, r↾ λ) in cases where (λ > α and) s and r are not defined on ordinals below α. There are several ways to make sense of such references but they are all equivalent since the truth value of sentences in (λ; s↾ λ, r↾ λ) only depends on the restriction of s and r to tail-ends of λ, by Claim 1.9. * , a in it with b = I and b * ∈ F . Thus if we can compute the character of A on an input X we can tell whether X is accepted. Our plan is to construct, in the next section, a deterministic automaton that can compute the character of a given non-deterministic automaton.
A run witnessing this can be composed with s↾ [β,
⊣ By a character in general we mean a set of quadruples b, D, a, b * with b, b * ∈ S, D ⊂ S, and a ∈ S ∪ {↑}. We use C to denote the set of all possible characters. Notice that C is finite, since S is finite.
Definition 3.5. For a character C and σ ∈ Σ define C * σ to be the set of quadruples b, D, a, b * so that there exists b ′ ∈ S, a ′ ∈ S ∪ {↑}, and D ′ ⊂ S with:
Claim 3.6. Suppose that C = C X (α, β) and that X(β) = σ. Then C X (α, β + 1) is precisely equal to C * σ.
Proof. Immediate from the definitions. ⊣ Definition 3.7. Let C and E be characters. Define C * E ω to be the set of quadruples b, D, a, b * so that there exists D 0 , D 1 ⊂ S, a 0 , a 1 ∈ S ∪ {↑}, and b 1 ∈ S, with:
One of the following conditions holds:
(a) a 0 ∈ S and a = a 0 .
, and a = b * .
In condition (4) we are using the notation of Remark 2.2.
Lemma 3.8. Suppose that C, E, α, β n (n < ω), and β are such that: 1. α < β 0 < β 1 < · · · and β = sup n<ω β n .
2. For every n, C X (α, β n ) is equal to C. 3. For every n and every m > n, C X (β n , β m ) = E.
we can create functions s : [α, β) → S and r : [α, β) ⇀ S so that:
r and r need not be the same, as there may be ξ, for example in the interval [α, β 0 ), so that the pebble placed on ξ is removed at an ordinal γ > β 0 . In this caser(ξ) is defined, but r(ξ) is not. The same is true in each of the intervals [β n , β n+1 ). But notice that there can be only finitely many such ordinals ξ within each interval, as there are only finitely many pebbles. Thus:
(iv)r↾ β n ≈ r↾ β n for each n < ω.
Note that cf(s↾ β) = D 1 . Using this and conditions (4) in Definition 3.7 it follows that:
Conditions (i)-(v) taken together imply that s,r is a run of A on X↾ [α, β). Using condition (5) 
and define r δ,η : [δ, η) ⇀ S by r δ,η (ξ) = s(γ) where γ ∈ (ξ, η] is least so that h(s(ξ)) ∈ u(s(γ)) if there is such an ordinal γ, and r δ,η (ξ) =↑ otherwise. As usual r δ,η need not equal r↾ [δ, η), as there may be pebbles placed on ordinals in [δ, η) which are removed at a stage later than η. But r δ,η ≈ r↾ [δ, η). From this, the definition of r δ,η , and the fact that s, r is a run of A on X↾ [α, β), it follows that: (vi) s δ,η , r δ,η is a run of A on X↾ [δ, η).
Since the set of states S is finite, there must be a specific state b 1 ∈ S, a specific a 1 ∈ S ∪ {↑}, and an infinite set Q ⊂ {β n | n < ω}, so that: (vii) s(δ) = b 1 and r(δ) = a 1 for each δ ∈ Q.
Let D 1 = cf(s↾ β). By throwing away an initial segment of Q if needed we may assume that {s(ξ) | δ ≤ ξ < β} = D 1 for each δ ∈ Q. Since D 1 is finite we may, by passing to a subset of Q that is still infinite, assume that in fact:
(viii) {s(ξ) | δ ≤ ξ ≤ η} = D 1 for all δ < η both in Q.
For each ordinal ξ < β let γ(ξ) ∈ (ξ, β] be the smallest ordinal so that h(s(ξ)) ∈ u(s(γ(ξ))) if there is such an ordinal. This is the ordinal where the pebble placed on ξ is removed in the run s, r . Note that γ(δ) is defined and strictly smaller than β for all but finitely many δ ∈ Q. Throwing away an initial segment of Q if necessary we may therefore assume that γ(δ) < β for all δ ∈ Q. Shrinking Q further, but still keeping it cofinal in β, we may assume that γ(δ) is smaller than the next element of Q above δ, and from this it follows that: (ix) r δ,η (δ) = r(δ) for δ < η both in Q.
From conditions (vi)-(ix) it follows that b 1 , D 1 , a 1 , b 1 ∈ C X (δ, η) for all δ < η both in Q. Since Q ⊂ {β n | n < ω}, and C X (β n , β m ) = E for all n < m < ω, it certainly follows that
Let ν ∈ Q be large enough that γ(α), if defined, is either smaller than ν or equal to β. Let a 0 = r α,ν (α) and let D 0 = {s(ξ) | α ≤ ξ ≤ ν}. Then s α,ν , r α,ν witnesses that b, D 0 , a 0 , b 1 ∈ C X (α, ν). Since ν ∈ Q = {β n | n < ω}, and since
It is now easy to check that D 0 , D 1 , a 0 , a 1 , and b 1 witness that b, D, a, b * belongs to C * E ω . ⊣ §4. Determinism. Fix throughout the section a finite alphabet Σ and a Σ-automaton A = S, P, T, ϕ, Ψ, h, u .
Fix an ordinal θ and an input string X : θ → Σ. We describe a process that computes C X (0, θ). We will later check that this process can be carried out by a deterministic automaton, thereby showing that any language that is recognizable by a non-deterministic automaton is also recognizable by a deterministic automaton.
Let C be the set of characters corresponding to the automaton A. Let #C denote the number of elements of C. Let H = {0, . . . , #C}.
Call an ordinal α essential at β if α < β, so that C X (α, β) makes sense, and there is noᾱ < α so that C X (ᾱ, β) = C X (α, β). Notice that there are at most #C ordinals which are essential at any given β.
By induction we define a sequence of sets K γ ⊂ H for γ ≤ θ, and ordinals α γ i for i ∈ K γ (and also for some i ∈ K γ ), so that {α γ i | i ∈ K γ } is precisely the set of all ordinals which are essential at γ. Notice that K γ then has at most #C elements, and is therefore a proper subset of H. Set h γ to be the least element of H − K γ , and set α γ hγ = γ. These assignments will be used during the induction. Set K 0 = ∅ to begin with. Assuming that K β and α β i | i ∈ K β are known for all β < γ, define K <γ = {i | i ∈ K β ∪ {h β } for a tail-end of β < γ, and α 
It is easy to verify by induction on γ that {α γ i | i ∈ K γ } is precisely the set of all ordinals which are essential at γ. The proof uses Claim 3.4, which implies that ordinals which are not essential at some β < γ are also not essential at γ.
We refer to ordinals which belong to {α γ i | i ∈ K <γ } but not to {α γ i | i ∈ K γ } as discarded at stage γ. Numbers i which belong to K <γ but not to K γ are released at stage γ. Thus an ordinal α = α γ i is discarded at stage γ if in stage γ the character from α "merges" with the character from a smaller ordinal, precisely, if there isᾱ < α so that C X (α, γ) = C X (ᾱ, γ). All but finitely many ordinals must be discarded eventually, since the set of possible characters is finite.
Remark 4.1. We do not know at stage α whether α will be discarded, and if so, with which of the characters from smaller ordinals will the character from α merge. But using pebbles we will be able to design an automaton A with run ŝ,r so thatr(α) has this information. The use of pebbles in A lets us delay the definition ofr(α) until (if ever) reaching a stage where α is discarded.
Let R γ be the order on K <γ defined by i R γ j iff α
Notice that with these definitions, j is released at γ iff there exists i R γ j so that
where i → C γ i and i, j → C γ i,j denote the obvious functions, the former defined on all i ∈ K <γ and the latter on all pairs i, j ∈ K <γ with i R γ j. Definition 4.3. Define S to be the set
where P(A) denotes the powerset of A and (A ⇀ B) denotes the set of partial functions from A to B.
The tupleb γ belongs to S for each γ. Notice that S is finite, as both H and C are finite. 
f, K in S with 0 ∈ K <γ , and leaving z(b) undefined on the other tuples.
Notice thatb 0 is precisely equal to I, and that for each γ > 0, z(b γ ) is defined and equal to C X (0, γ), as 0 ∈ K <γ and α γ 0 = 0 for all γ > 0. Remark 4.5. f γ and K γ can be determined from knowledge of K <γ , R γ , C γ i for each i ∈ K <γ , and C γ i,j for each pair i R γ j. Thus the entire stateb γ can be determined (independently of X and γ) from knowledge of K <γ , R γ , C γ i for each i ∈ K <γ , and C γ i,j for each pair i R γ j.
Claim 4.6.b γ+1 can be determined (independently of X and γ) from knowledge ofb γ and X(γ).
Proof. Using the last remark it is enough to determine
for i ∈ K γ is equal to C γ i * X(γ) by Claim 3.6, and C γ+1 hγ is equal to C ∅ * X(γ) where C ∅ = { b, {b}, ↑, b | b ∈ S} is the character C X (γ, γ) (this character is the same regardless of γ and X). Finally,
⊣ Letŝ : θ+1 → S be the function (γ →b γ ). By the last claim, there is a function T : S ×Σ → S, independent of X, so thatb(γ +1) = T (b(γ), X(γ)). Our intention is to show thatŝ is produced as a run of a deterministic automaton on X (and that the automaton of course is defined independently of X). This function T provides the successor transition table for the automaton. We continue now to work on the limits. Claim 4.7. For limit γ, each of K <γ , R γ , and C γ i,j for i R γ j, can be determined (independently of X and γ) from knowledge of cf(ŝ↾ γ).
Proof. It is easy to check that i ∈ K <γ iff i ∈ K β for a tail-end of β < γ, and since K β is coded as part ofŝ(β) the truth value of the right-hand-side condition can be determined from knowledge of cf(ŝ↾ γ). Similarly, i R γ j iff i R β j for a tail-end of β < γ, and C γ i,j is equal to the eventual value of C β i,j as β −→ γ. ⊣ Claim 4.8. Let γ be a limit of cofinality ω and let k ∈ K <γ . Then there exists i ∈ H, j ∈ H, and C, E ∈ C so that:
2. The set {β < γ | j is released at β, f β (j) = i, E , and C β k,j is defined and equal to C} is cofinal in γ.
Proof. Letγ = max{α γ l | l ∈ K <γ }.γ is smaller than γ since γ is a limit. Notice that the set Q = {β ∈ (γ, γ) | min{α β l | l ∈ K <β ∧ α β l >γ} is discarded at β} is cofinal in γ, since otherwise the eventual value of min{α
For each β ∈ Q let g(β) = i, j, C, E where j = j(β), i, E = f β (j), and C = C β k,j . g takes values in the finite set H × H × C × C. Thus there is a fixed tuple i, j, C, E so that g(β) = i, j, C, E for cofinally many β ∈ Q. Every such β belongs to the set in condition (2) of the claim, so this set is cofinal in γ. As for condition (1) : α β i < α β j by the definition of f β , and from the definition of j(β) it follows that α β i ≤γ. Applying this with β < γ large enough that all ordinals ≤γ which do not belong to {α γ l | l ∈ K <γ } have been discarded by stage β, it follows that i ∈ K <γ . ⊣ Lemma 4.9. Let γ be a limit of cofinality ω and let k ∈ K <γ . Let i, j, C, and E satisfy the conditions of the previous claim. Then
Proof. Using condition (2) of the previous claim and the fact that cof(γ) = ω, we may fix an increasing sequence of ordinals β n (n < ω), cofinal in γ, so that for each n, j is released at β n , f βn (j) = i, E , and C βn k,j is defined and equal to C.
Let α n = α βn j , so that α n is discarded at stage β n . The set {α n | n < ω} cannot be bounded in γ; if it were then its ordinals would all be discarded by some stage strictly below γ, contradicting the fact that {β n | n < ω} is cofinal in γ.
By thinning the set {β n | n < ω} if needed we may therefore assume that: (i) α n | n < ω is increasing, and α n+1 > β n for each n. Let α denote α γ i . The assignment makes sense as i ∈ K <γ by condition (1) of Claim 4.8. α γ i is equal to α β i for all sufficiently large β < γ, and without loss of generality we may assume that this is the case for all β ∈ {β n | n < ω}. So α βn i = α for each n. Recall that α n = α βn j is discarded at stage β n and f βn (j) = i, E . Using the definition of f βn it follows that:
(
Note that C X (α, α m ) = E by condition (ii). Thus from condition (iv) it follows that in fact:
(v) C X (α n , α m ) = E for all n and all m > n. α β k is equal to α γ k for all sufficiently large β < γ, and without loss of generality we may assume that this is the case for all β ∈ {β n | n < ω}. We have C βn k,j = C for each n. Since α βn k = α γ k and α βn j = α n this means that:
With conditions (v) and (vi) we may apply Lemma 3.8 and conclude finally that C X (α γ k , γ) = C * E ω . ⊣ Corollary 4.10. Let γ be a limit of cofinality ω. Then for each k ∈ K <γ k , C γ k can be determined (independently of X and γ) from knowledge of cf(ŝ↾ γ). Proof. Looking at cf(ŝ↾ γ) one can tell which tuples i, j, C, E satisfy the conditions of Claim 4.8, and then use Lemma 4.9 to determine C γ k . ⊣ Corollary 4.11. Let γ be a limit of cofinality ω. Thenb γ can be determined (independently of X and γ) from knowledge of cf(ŝ↾ γ).
Proof. Immediate putting Remark 4.5, Claim 4.7 and Corollary 4.10 together. ⊣ Remark 4.12. Our handling of limits of cofinality ω here is very similar to the handling of countable limits in Büchi [2] . Both our handling of this issue and Büchi's use ideas which trace back to the subset construction of McNaughton [7] .
We pass now to limits of cofinality greater than ω.
For each ξ < θ letρ(ξ) > ξ be the ordinal at which ξ is discarded, if there is such an ordinal, and letr(ξ) =bρ (ξ) . If ξ is not discarded then leaver(ξ) undefined.
We intend to show thatŝ = b γ | γ ≤ θ andr form a run of a deterministic automaton A on X. Definition 4.13 determines the handling of pebbles in runs of A. The definition is such that the pebble placed on ξ during the run ŝ,r is precisely equal to h ξ , and the pebble is released precisely when ξ is discarded. From this and the definition ofr it follows that condition (R) in Section 2 holds for ŝ,r .
Remark 4.14. We are using the availability of pebbles in automata to delay the definition ofr(ξ) in runs of A, so that it is made not at stage ξ but later on at the stageρ(ξ) in which ξ is discarded. The run is constructed so that r(ξ) = s(ρ(ξ)), and this is essential to the proof of Claim 4.15 below.
We continue now to define the deterministic Σ-automaton A. We already defined the set of states S, the successor transition function T , the set of pebbles P , and the functionsĥ andû. We also saw thatŝ(γ) can be determined from knowledge of cf(ŝ↾ γ) for limit γ of cofinality ω. It remains to see that for limit γ of cofinality greater than ω,ŝ(γ) can be determined from knowledge of the truth value of finitely many fixed sentences in (γ;ŝ↾ γ,r↾ γ).
Claim 4.15. Let γ be a limit of cofinality greater than ω 1 . Then there exists a club Z ⊂ γ so that for every ξ < β both in Z with cof(β) = ω, C X (ξ, β) can be determined (independently of X, ξ, β, Z, and γ) from knowledge ofŝ(ξ),r(ξ), and cf(ŝ↾ γ).
Proof. Let Z ⊂ γ be a club so that for each ξ ∈ Z: (i) cf(s↾ ξ) = cf(s↾ γ).
(ii) (∀ζ < ξ)(ρ(ζ) < γ →ρ(ζ) < ξ). (iii)ρ(ξ) is defined and smaller than the next element of Z above ξ. Conditions (i) and (ii) can be obtained through a closure argument using the fact that cof(γ) ≥ ω 1 . Condition (iii) is obtained by a closure argument using the fact thatρ(ξ) is defined and smaller than γ for all but finitely many ξ < γ.
Fix ξ < β both in Z with cof(β) = ω. We describe how to determine C X (ξ, β), using only knowledge ofŝ(ξ),r(ξ), and cf(ŝ↾ γ).
By condition (iii), ξ is discarded at stageρ(ξ) < β. Let k, D be such that fρ (ξ) (h ξ ) = k, D . h ξ can be determined from knowledge ofŝ(ξ), and fρ (ξ) can be determined from knowledge ofŝ(ρ(ξ)) =r(ξ). Hence k can be determined from knowledge ofŝ(ξ) andr(ξ).
The definition of fρ (ξ) is such that C X (αρ
(We are using here the fact that αρ (ξ) h ξ = ξ.) Since β >ρ(ξ) it follows by Claim 3.4 that
is an ordinal below ξ which had not been discarded by stageρ(ξ). From condition (ii) it follows that the ordinal is not discarded by stage β (in fact not even by stage γ), and therefore αρ
can be determined from knowledge of cf(ŝ↾ β) by Corollary 4.10, and cf(ŝ↾ β) can be determined from cf(ŝ↾ γ) by condition (i). ⊣ Using the last claim, fix a function Λ : S × S × P( S) → C (independently of X), so that for every γ of cofinality greater than ω:
( * ) there is a club Z ⊂ γ, so that C X (ξ, β) = Λ(ŝ(ξ),r(ξ), cf(ŝ↾ γ)) for all ξ < β both in Z with cof(β) = ω.
Lemma 4.16. Let γ be a limit of cofinality greater than ω, and let
γ → S, and r : γ ⇀ S so that:
• a 0 ∈ S and a = a 0 .
•
, and a =↑.
(In conditions (3), (4), and (5a) we are using the terminology of Definition 2.1 and Remark 2.2.) (3) and (4) say that, on a club, the skeleton behaves like a run of A. In the proof of the lemma we shall see that if there is a run witnessing b, D, a, b * ∈ C X (α γ k , γ), then this run satisfies conditions (1)- (5), and in the other direction, any skeleton satisfying the conditions can be completed to a run witnessing b, D, a, b * ∈ C X (α 
is released before stage γ, and let a 0 =↑ if the pebble is released at γ or not released at all. It is easy to check that conditions (1)- (5) hold for a 0 , D 0 , D * , s, and r. The runs witnessing condition (1) 
for sufficiently large β. Using ( * ) above we may assume that Λ(ŝ(ξ),r(ξ), cf(ŝ↾ γ)) in condition (2) is equal to C X (ξ, β), and for almost all ξ and β, the run s↾ [ξ, β], r↾ [ξ, β) witnesses that s(ξ), D * , r(ξ), s(β) belongs to this character. Conditions (3) and (4) hold because s, r is a run of A. Condition (5) (1)- (5). We work to show that b, D, a, b * belongs to C X (α γ k , γ). Let Z 1 ⊂ γ be a club witnessing ( * ). Let Z 2 be the intersection of the clubs witnessing the truth of the "for almost all" statements in conditions (1)- (4). Let Z ⊂ Z 1 ∩ Z 2 be a club so that every ξ ∈ Z which is not a limit point of Z has cofinality ω.
Let ξ 0 be the first element of Z, and for each ξ ∈ Z let β(ξ) be the first element of Z above ξ. (Notice that β(ξ) has cofinality ω.) Fix a run s 0 , r 0 of
. This is possible using condition (1) . For each ξ ∈ Z fix a run s ξ , r ξ of A on X↾ [ξ, β(ξ)) witnessing that s(ξ), D * , r(ξ), s(β(ξ)) belongs to C X (ξ, β(ξ)). This is possible using condition (2) and ( * ) above.
Define
for the least such ρ, and otherwise a 0 =↑. (vi) There is an ordinal ρ ∈ (ξ, β(ξ)] so that h(s * (ξ)) ∈ u(s * (ρ)), and s * (ρ) for the least such ρ is equal to r(ξ). 
if there is such an ordinal, and undefined otherwise. Let r * (ξ) = s * (ρ * (ξ)). Notice then that:
This follows from conditions (iv) and (v) above, the fact that s * (γ) = b * , and condition (5c) in Lemma 4.16. Notice further that for ξ ∈ Z:
This follows from condition (vi) above.
Claim 4.18. For every β ∈ Z ∪ {γ} which is a limit point of Z, s
Proof. Suppose first that β has cofinality ω. By condition (iv) and since β is a limit point of Z, cf(s
where the last equality uses condition (3) in Lemma 4.16 and condition (ii) above.
Suppose next that β has cofinality ω 1 or greater. Notice that by conditions (ii) and (viii), s * and r * agree with s and r on the set Z∩β, which is closed unbounded in β. By Claim 1.9 it follows that a sentence of L * S is true in (β; s * ↾ β, r * ↾ β) iff it is true in (β; s↾ β, r↾ β). From this in turn it follows that (Ψ ⊕ ϕ)(β; s * ↾ β, r * ↾ β) is equal to (Ψ ⊕ ϕ)(β; s↾ β, r↾ β). Finally (Ψ ⊕ ϕ)(β; s↾ β, r↾ β) is equal to s * (β)
Altogether then one can determine each of K <γ , R γ , C γ k for k ∈ K <γ , and C γ i,j for all pairs i R γ j. By Remark 4.5 one can therefore determineŝ(γ).
⊣ Let φ list all the sentences in the set Φ. Recall that t φ (γ;ŝ,r) is the function, from lh( φ) into 2, defined by the condition t φ (γ;ŝ;r) (i) = 1 if (γ;ŝ,r) |= φ i and t φ (γ;ŝ;r) (i) = 0 otherwise. Thus t φ (γ;ŝ;r) codes the truth value of each of the sentences of Φ in (γ;ŝ,r). By the last corollary there is a function Ψ : 2 lh( φ) → S (independent of X) so thatŝ(γ) = Ψ(t φ (γ;ŝ,r) ) for every limit γ. We have now completed the definition of a deterministic Σ-automaton A = S, P , T , Ψ, φ,ĥ,û so that ŝ,r as defined above is a run of A on X. We also defined, in Definition 4.4, a state I ∈ S and a function z : S ⇀ C so thatŝ(0) = I and z(ŝ(γ)) = C X (0, γ) for each γ > 0.
Our definitions of A, I, and z were independent of the input string X. We have therefore proved the following theorem:
Theorem 4.23. Let Σ be a finite alphabet and let A be a Σ-automaton. Then there is a deterministic Σ-automaton A, with a set of states S say, a particular state I ∈ S, and a function z : S ⇀ C (where C is the set of characters for the original automaton A), so that: for every ordinal θ and every input string X : θ → Σ, if ŝ,r is the unique run of A on X withŝ(0) = I, then z(ŝ(γ)) = C X (0, γ) for each γ ∈ (0, θ]. ⊣ Corollary 4.24. Let Σ be a finite alphabet and let A be a Σ-automaton. Let I, F be an accepting condition for A. Then there is a deterministic Σ-automaton A, with an accepting condition I, F , so that for every ordinal θ and every input string X : θ → Σ, A, I, F accepts X iff A, I, F accepts X.
Proof. Let Q be the set of characters C so that
Then A, I, F accepts an input string X of length θ iff C X (0, θ) belongs to Q. Let A, I, and z be as in the previous theorem. If A, I, F accepts the unique input string of length 0 then let F = z −1′′ Q ∪ { I}, and otherwise let F = z −1′′ Q. Then A, I, F accepts X : θ → Σ ⇐⇒ θ = 0 and A, I, F accepts X, or θ > 0 and C X (0, θ) ∈ Q ⇐⇒ A, I, F accepts X. ⊣ §5. Formulae to Automata. For a ∈ ON define χ f (a) : ON → 2 through the condition χ f (γ) = 1 if γ = a and χ f (γ) = 0 otherwise. For a ⊂ ON define χ s (a) : ON → 2 through the condition χ s (γ) = 1 if γ ∈ a and χ s (γ) = 0 otherwise. (f and s here stand for "first order" and "second order.") Given a monadic second order formula ϕ with free variables x 1 , . . . , x k let sig(ϕ) : k → {s, f} be the function defined by the condition sig(ϕ)(i) = s if x i is a second order variable, and sig(ϕ)(i) = f if x i is a first order variable.
A sequence a 1 , . . . , a k is said to fit the signature of ϕ if a i is an ordinal for i such that sig(ϕ)(i) = f, and a set of ordinals for i such that sig(ϕ)(i) = s. Given a sequence a 1 , . . . , a k which fits the signature of ϕ define χ(a 1 , . . . , a k ) : ON → 2 k to be the function χ sig(ϕ) (1) 
The work in the previous sections leads to the following theorem, which provides the crucial link between monadic second order formulae over the ordinals and our finite state automata. The theorem relies heavily on the determinism proved in Section 4.
Theorem 5.1. Let ϕ be a monadic second order formula in the language of order, with k free variables say. Then there is a deterministic finite state automaton A, with accepting condition I, F , so that: for every ordinal θ, and for every sequence a 1 , . . . , a k of elements and subsets of θ which fits the signature of ϕ, (θ;
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The case that ϕ is atomic is a simple exercise. The inductive case of conjunction is a direct application of Lemma 2.4. The inductive case of negation is a direct application of Claim 2.7. Finally the inductive case of existential quantification (either first or second order) is an application of Claim 2.3 followed by an application of Corollary 4.24 to obtain a deterministic automaton equivalent to the nondeterministic automaton produced by Claim 2.3. ⊣ Remark 5.2. Theorem 5.1 holds also in the case that θ is the class of all ordinals, with both the quantifiers of ϕ and the quantifiers appearing in the "almost-all" sentences used in A interpreted as ranging over classes.
Remark 5.3. The construction of A from ϕ is effective. Thus, there is in fact a recursive function which assigns to each formula ϕ an automaton A and accepting condition I, F witnessing Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.1 has a converse:
Claim 5.4. Given an automaton A on a finite alphabet Σ = {σ 1 , . . . , σ n } and an accepting condition I, F , there is a monadic second order formula ϕ so that A, I, F accepts X : θ → Σ iff (θ; <) |= ϕ[a 1 , . . . , a n ] where a i = {ξ | X(ξ) = σ i }.
Proof. This can be seen through coding strings of states of A by sets of ordinals, and having ϕ express the existence of an accepting run: Let S = {e 1 , . . . , e k } be the set of states of A. For s : θ → S and r : θ ⇀ S define b i = {ξ < θ | s(ξ) = e i } and c i = {ξ < θ | r(ξ) = e i }. It is enough to show that there are formulae ψ i so that (θ; <) |= ψ i [a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , c 1 , . . . , b k , c k ] iff s ⌢ e i , r is a run of A on X. Using second order existential quantification one can then obtain ϕ from the formulae ψ i for i such that e i ∈ F . Now ψ i must simply express conditions (S), (L), and (R) in Section 2. It is clear that each of the conditions can be expressed in the monadic language, and in fact only first order quantifiers are needed for conditions (S) and (R). Let us just note that T , Ψ, h, and u are finite objects, and the references to these objects in conditions (S), (L), and (R) can be removed, replacing the conditions by long, but finite, disjunctions of cases, ranging over all possible configurations which satisfy the requirements involving T , Ψ, h, and u. The almost-all formulae from ϕ appear as subformulae in the disjunction in the case of condition (L). In the case of conditions (S) and (R) the disjunction is first order. ⊣ s↾θ + 1, r↾ θ ), and therefore (θ, <) |= ϕ. But this contradicts the assumption that ϕ pinpoints θ. ⊣ An ordinal θ is definable by a monadic formula over (ON; <) if there is a monadic formula ϕ with one free variable so that (ON; <) |= ϕ[α] iff α = θ.
Lemma 6.7. Suppose that θ is definable by a monadic formula over (ON; <). Then θ can be pinpointed.
Proof. Let ϕ be a formula defining θ. Using Theorem 5.1 fix a deterministic automaton A with an accepting condition I, F so that (ON; <) |= ϕ[α] iff A, I, F accepts X α , where X α : ON → 2 is the function determined by the condition X α (ξ) = 1 if ξ = α and X α (ξ) = 0 otherwise.
Since (ON; <) |= ϕ[θ], A, I, F accepts X θ . Let s, r be the accepting run, so that s(0) = I and s(ON) ∈ F . (By s(ON) we mean the final state reached by A running on the class-length input X α .) Let b * = s(θ).
Claim 6.8. There is noθ < θ so that s(θ) = b * .
Proof. Suppose for contradictionθ < θ and s(θ) = s(θ). Define s * : ON+1 → S through the conditions:
• s * (ξ) = s(ξ) for ξ ≤θ.
• s * (θ + ξ) = s(θ + ξ).
(Notice that there is no conflict between the two conditions, as s(θ) = s(θ).) Define r * : ON ⇀ S setting r * (ξ) = s * (ζ) for the least ζ > ξ so that h(s * (ξ)) ∈ u(s * (ζ)) if there is such a ζ, and r * (ξ) =↑ otherwise. It is easy to check that s * , r * is a run of A on Xθ. Since s * (0) = I and s * (ON) = s(ON) ∈ F , s * , r * witnesses that A, I, F accepts Xθ. It follows that (ON; <) |= ϕ [θ] , and this is a contradiction since ϕ is only true of θ. ⊣ For each ordinal α let Y α : α → 2 be the constant function 0, that is the function Y (ξ) = 0 for all ξ < α. Notice that X θ ↾ θ is simply Y θ .
Let F * = {b * }. Then A, I, F * accepts Y θ = X θ ↾ θ (the run witnessing this is s↾ θ + 1, r↾ θ ). By the last claim and since A is deterministic, A, I, F * does not accept Yθ for anyθ < θ.
Using Claim 5.4 , that is using the fact that the existence of accepting runs can be expressed in the monadic langauge, fix a sentence ψ so that (α; <) |= ψ iff A, I, F * accepts Y α . Then (θ; <) |= ψ, and for allθ < θ, (θ; <) |= ψ. Hence ψ pinpoints θ.
2 (Lemma 6.7)
Theorem 6.9. Let θ be a limit ordinal closed under ordinal multiplication by its cofinality. Then θ cannot be defined by a monadic formula over (ON; <).
Proof. If θ can be defined then by Lemma 6.7 it can be pinpointed, contradicting Theorem 6.6. ⊣ All cardinals are closed under ordinal multiplication, so every cardinal κ with cof(κ) < κ is closed under ordinal multiplication by its cofinality. Using Theorem 6.9 it follows finally that no singular cardinal can be defined by a monadic formula over (ON; <).
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